1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BENJAMIN DENNIS GOODE, Case No.: 21-CV-2054-GPC

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 v. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

14 J. CANEDO, [ECF No. 62] 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. For 19 the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 20 II. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. 22 He alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Defendant forced him to 23 quarantine with thirty to forty COVID-19 positive inmates. ECF No. 61 at 2. Plaintiff 24 argues that Defendant ordered this quarantine despite Plaintiff explaining that his most 25 recent COVID-19 test was negative. Id. After one night in quarantine, Plaintiff was 26 moved to isolation. Id. He remained in isolation for 56 days. Id. at 6. Plaintiff’s 27 complaint alleges PTSD, sleep deprivation, and drastic weight gain because of this 28 isolation. Id. at 2. 1 Defendant subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings, challenging 2 Plaintiff’s complaint on two grounds. ECF No. 50 at 1. First, Defendant argued that 3 Plaintiff’s alleged physical injury, drastic weight gain, is not greater than de minimis. Id. 4 at 5. Second, Defendant argued that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his 56-day 5 quarantine caused any such injury. Id. The Court denied Defendant’s motion, finding 6 that Plaintiff’s pleadings sufficiently demonstrated both injury and causation. ECF No. 7 61. Plaintiff now moves the Court for judgment on the pleadings. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought, “after pleadings are 10 closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P 12(c). When considering a 11 motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court “must accept all factual allegations in the 12 complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 13 Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 14 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). The movant is entitled to judgment only where it has been 15 “clearly established on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to 16 be resolved.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co, Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 17 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). An “analysis under Rule 12(c) is ‘substantially identical’ to 18 analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, ‘a court must determine whether 19 the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.’” 20 Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brooks v. Dunlop 21 Mfg. Inc., No. C 10-04341, WL 6140912 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011)). 22 IV. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiff argues that the Court’s prior order, denying Defendant’s motion for 24 judgment on the pleadings, entitles him to relief. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the 25 order establishes three findings: (1) Plaintiff affirmatively and validly demonstrated all 26 elements of an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983; (2) his alleged physical injury is 27 “more than de minimis”; and (3) “Defendant caused this injury.” ECF No. 62 at 3–4. 28 These findings, Plaintiff argues, led the Court to “draw all reasonable inferences” in his 1 favor. Id. at 4. Thus, Plaintiff interprets the order as corroborating the underlying merits 2 of his Eighth Amendment claim. See id. (“Plaintiff concurs with the advisement”). 3 Plaintiff argues that with no “further issues raised by the Defendant’s counsel,” he is 4 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 5 Plaintiff interpretation of the Court’s previous order is misguided. See ECF No. 6 61. In assessing Plaintiff’s claim, the Court did not substantiate his alleged Eighth 7 Amendment violation. Rather, the Court considered only whether Plaintiff pleaded 8 sufficient facts to state a viable claim. See Chavez, 683 F.3d at 1108 (holding “a court 9 must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the 10 plaintiff to a legal remedy”). The Court’s order established only two preliminary 11 findings. First, Plaintiff’s drastic weight gain, as pled, was greater than de minimis. ECF 12 No. 61 at 5. Second, it was plausible that Defendant’s isolation of Plaintiff for 56-days 13 caused this injury. Id. at 6. Neither finding affirmed that an Eighth Amendment 14 violation had occurred as a matter of law. Instead, the order concluded only that 15 Plaintiff’s claim was sufficient to withstand Defendant’s motion for judgment on the 16 pleadings. Plaintiff’s reliance on the order for anything more than that must fail. 17 Plaintiff also misunderstands why the Court drew all reasonable inferences in his 18 favor. The Court’s decision to do so was not predicated on the strength of the alleged 19 facts nor the merits of the claim. Rather, the Court was obligated to do so on account of 20 Plaintiff being the non-moving party. See Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925 (holding a court must 21 construe all factual evidence as true and “in the light most favorable to the non-moving 22 party). Thus, the Court drew all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor in accordance 23 with the standard governing the motion. Because Plaintiff is now the moving party, the 24 Court no longer considers his pleadings with such deference. 25 Lastly, Plaintiff perceives the lack of “further issues raised by the Defense’s 26 counsel” as supporting his claim for judgement. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 27 Defendant’s failure to respond to this Court’s order on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment 28 1 on the Pleadings, ECF No. 61, requires the Court to grant his motion in the “interest of 2 judicial economy.” ECF No. 62 at 4. However, this is incorrect for two reasons. 3 First, Defendant was under no obligation to raise any additional issues in response 4 to the Court’s previous order. The Court’s order considered the merits of Defendant’s 5 motion. With the merits of the motion resolved, the motion was no longer in 6 adjudication. See Gorromeo v. Zachares, 15 Fed. Appx. 555, 556 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 7 denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not ordinarily appealable . . . .”). 8 Therefore, any response from the Defendant was unnecessary, as consideration of his 9 claim was complete. 10 Second, Plaintiff fails to account for the existing affirmative defenses raised by the 11 Defendant’s answer. See ECF No. 21. A “plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on the 12 pleadings when the answer raises issues of fact that, if proved, would defeat recovery.” 13 Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist 14 Congressional Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendant’s answer to 15 Plaintiff’s amended complaint included five affirmative defenses: (1) Plaintiff has failed 16 to exhaust all available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act; 17 (2) Plaintiff fails to state an actual injury; (3) the doctrine of unclean hands bars 18 Plaintiff’s ability to seek damages; (4) at all times Defendant’s actions were reasonably 19 related to achieving legitimate penological goals; and (5) the doctrine of qualified 20 immunity shields Defendant from liability because the Defendant did not violate any 21 clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person in 22 Defendant’s position would have known. ECF No. 21 at 6. With material issues of fact 23 remaining, this Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 24 V. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the 26 Pleadings is DENIED. 27 /// 28 /// 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 ||Dated: April 5, 2024 (73 salto OA ) 3 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel 4 United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28