1 FOR PUBLICATION 2 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3 4 In re: DUMACE LEONARD LEGRAND, ) Case No. 19-21198-C-7 ) 5 Debtor. ) Dkt. Control No. SJT-1 ________________________________) 6 7 OPINION 8 Before: Christopher M. Klein, Bankruptcy Judge _________________ 9 Susan J. Turner, River City Law, Sacramento, CA, for Debtor 10 Laura McCarthy Hoalst, Winn Law Group, Fullerton, CA, for 11 Respondents Cavalry Portfolio Services, Cavalry SPV-1, LLC, & Winn Law Group _______________ 12 13 CHRISTOPHER M. KLEIN, Bankruptcy Judge: 14 “No fair ground of doubt as to whether the [bankruptcy 15 discharge] order barred the creditor’s conduct” warrants civil 16 contempt says the Supreme Court. Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. 17 1795 (2019). This is such a case. 18 Although civil contempt for discharge violations is 19 warranted, the automatic stay remedy under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) 20 applies because the series of offending wage garnishments began 21 before discharge at the behest of debt collectors who had no 22 sense of urgency about obeying the law. Civil contempt’s milder 23 remedies do not eclipse the stronger medicine of § 362(k)(1). 24 There would have been no violations if the respondents had 25 terminated their earnings withholding order before “closing” 26 their files and sticking their heads in the sand. Debt 27 collectors have an affirmative duty upon learning of bankruptcy 28 to terminate garnishments they have launched. 1 The stay-violating conduct having been “willful” within the 2 meaning of § 362(k)(1) and there also being “no fair ground of 3 doubt as to whether” the automatic stay and the discharge 4 injunction barred the garnishments, § 362(k)(1) stay violation 5 remedies, including punitive damages, are appropriate. 6 7 Facts 8 Cavalry SPV I, LLC, as assignee of Citibank, N.A. 9 (“Cavalry”), obtained a $20,791.07 money judgment against Dumace 10 LeGrand in a California state court. 11 A Writ of Execution directed to the Sheriff of Los Angeles 12 County was issued January 8, 2019. 13 An Application for Earnings Withholding Order and an 14 Earnings Withholding Order (“EWO”) were prepared January 30, 15 2019, on official California forms on behalf of Cavalry by its 16 attorney, Winn Law Group (“Winn”), filed February 4, 2019, and 17 served on LeGrand’s employer on February 5, 2019. 18 Winn advertises its expertise in debt collection matters as 19 the “premier creditor’s rights firm in California.”1 20 The Employer’s Return form on the EWO reported gross 21 earnings of $1,008.00 during the last weekly pay period. It 22 further reported in Item 5 that “employer has received another 23 order affecting the employee’s earnings and earnings are being 24 withheld for this other order because this order does not have 25 higher priority.” The other order was described as “CA Child 26 27 1Website: “Winn Law Group is the premier creditor rights 28 law firm in California.” http://www.winnlawgroup.com/about (viewed January 21, 2020). 1 Support, Case 15FL00805MOD4, currently $216.48 weekly.” 2 The Employer’s Return did not check the box: “This order is 3 not effective for the reason shown in Item 5. It is returned to 4 the levying officer with this return.” Thus, the Employer’s 5 Return made clear that it was retaining the order, which is the 6 result contemplated by California Code of Civil Procedure 7 § 706.030(c)(3) when there is extant withholding for support. 8 Cavalry and Winn received the Employer’s Return dated 9 February 14, 2019, noting the existing withholding for support. 10 LeGrand filed chapter 7 case No. 2019-21198 on February 28, 11 2019. His chapter 7 discharge was entered June 17, 2019. The 12 chapter 7 case was closed June 24, 2019. 13 Cavalry and Winn were listed as creditors and admit that 14 they had notice of the case and of the discharge. 15 Upon learning of the filing of the chapter 7 case, Cavalry 16 and Winn “closed” their files, but they did not terminate 17 Cavalry’s EWO even though they admit that they had an affirmative 18 duty to do so. Nor is it controverted that they knew from the 19 Employer’s Return that their EWO had been retained by LeGrand’s 20 employer and, thus, remained potentially effective. 21 LeGrand’s employer did not have notice of the existence of 22 his bankruptcy case until June 28, 2019, eleven days after his 23 discharge was entered. 24 The employer honored Cavalry’s EWO for payrolls of May 22, 25 June 19, June 26, July 3, July 10, July 17, and August 7, 2019, 26 for a total of $883.35. 27 On July 10, 2019, LeGrand’s counsel sent to Winn a letter by 28 fax transmission (which was received) demanding immediate 1 termination of the garnishment, return of collected funds, 2 $500.00 in damages, and $500.00 in attorney’s fees. Her letter 3 stated an intent to pursue formal action if there was no 4 resolution by July 15, 2019. She followed her letter with 5 repeated futile attempts to talk with Winn by way of voicemail 6 messages requesting that her calls be returned. 7 Winn did not respond to the July 10 letter from LeGrand’s 8 counsel, did not respond to counsel’s voicemail messages, and did 9 not otherwise attempt to communicate with her before she filed 10 and served the motion for sanctions and fees on July 26, 2019. 11 On July 29, 2019, Winn executed, for Cavalry, a Notice of 12 Termination of EWO and sent a copy to LeGrand’s counsel. This 13 was Winn’s first communication to LeGrand’s counsel. 14 The Notice of Termination was directed to the Los Angeles 15 County Sheriff, who supposedly terminated the EWO on August 2, 16 2019, but not in time to prevent another garnishment on August 7. 17 This court issued an Order to Show Cause why Cavalry and 18 Winn should not be held in civil contempt or otherwise sanctioned 19 for violating the automatic stay and the discharge injunction. 20 21 Analysis 22 Assessing the questions of automatic stay violation, civil 23 contempt, and their consequences requires an excursion through 24 the California wage garnishment statute. 25 26 I 27 California wage garnishment procedure is prescribed by 28 Chapter 5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. CAL. CODE 1 CIV. PRO. §§ 706.010 - 706.154. 2 3 A 4 The dramatis personae include “judgment creditor,” “judgment 5 debtor” (aka “employee”2),” “employer,”3 and the “levying 6 officer” (Sheriff or authorized public officer). 7 8 B 9 The key concepts relevant here are “earnings,”4 “disposable 10 earnings,”5 “writ of execution,” “earnings withholding order,”6 11 12 13 2“Employee” includes “any individual who performs services 14 subject to the right of the employer to control both what shall be done and how it shall be done.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. 15 § 706.011(e). 16 3“‘Employer’ means a person for whom an employee performs services as an employee.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 707.011(f). And, 17 “‘Person’ includes an individual, a corporation, a partnership or other unincorporated association, a limited liability company, 18 and a public entity.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.011(i). 19 4“‘Earnings’ means compensation payable by an employer to an 20 employee for personal services performed by such employee, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 21 otherwise.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.011(b). 22 5“‘Disposable earnings’ means the portion of an individual’s earnings that remains after deducting all amounts required to be 23 withheld by law.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.011(a). 24 6A writ of execution is prerequisite to obtaining an earnings withholding order: “If a writ of execution has been 25 issued in the county where the judgment debtor’s employer is required to be served and the time specified in subdivision (b) 26 of Section 699.530 for levy on property under the writ has not 27 expired, a judgment creditor may apply for the issuance of an earnings withholding order by filing an application with a 28 levying officer in such county who shall promptly issue an earnings withholding order.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.102(a). 1 “employer’s return,” “levy of execution,”7 “lien created by 2 service of earnings withholding order,”8 “withholding period,”9 3 “priority of earnings withholding order,”10 “withholding order 4 for support,”11 “ineffective earnings withholding order,”12 5 7“[A] levy of execution upon the earnings of an employee 6 shall be made by service of an earnings withholding order upon 7 the employer.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.021. 8 8“Service of an earnings withholding order creates a lien upon the earnings of the judgment debtor that are required to be 9 withheld pursuant to the order and upon all property of the employer subject to the enforcement of a money judgment in the 10 amount required to be withheld pursuant to such order. The lien continues for a period of one year from the date the earnings of 11 the judgment debtor become payable unless the amount required to be withheld pursuant to the order is paid as required by law.” 12

CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.029.

13 9“‘[W]ithholding period’ means the period which commences on 14 the 10th day after service of an earnings withholding order upon the employer and which continues until the earliest of the 15 following dates: (1) The date the employer has withheld the full amount 16 required to satisfy the order. (2) The date of termination specified in a court order 17 served on the employer. (3) The date of termination specified in a notice of 18 termination served on the employer by the levying officer. 19 (4) The date of termination of a dormant or suspended earnings withholding order as determined pursuant to Section 20 706.032.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.022(a). 21 10The rule is first in time, first in right: “An employer shall comply with the first earnings withholding order served 22 upon the employer.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.023(a). 23 11“A ‘withholding order for support’ is an earnings withholding order issued on a writ of execution to collect 24 delinquent amounts payable under a judgment for the support of a 25 child, or spouse or former spouse, of the judgment debtor.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.030(a). 26 12An “ineffective” earnings withholding order results “[i]f 27 the employer is served while an employer is required to comply with another earnings withholding order with respect to the 28 earnings of the same employee, in which event the subsequent order that is “ineffective” until the prior order is terminated. 1 “dormant EWO,” and “suspended EWO.” 2 A cousin not governed by the Wage Garnishment Law is the 3 “earnings assignment order for support,” which, as an assignment, 4 has superpriority over all EWOs.13 5 6 C 7 The lien created by service of an EWO puts the employer at 8 risk of liability for so long as the EWO remains in the hands of 9 the employer. In addition to being a lien on the employee’s 10 wages, it constitutes a lien on employer’s property in the amount 11 required to be withheld. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.029. 12 13 D 14 Situations involving multiple EWOs receive three alternative 15 treatments under the California Wage Garnishment Law. 16 17 1 18 First, the usual rule is that EWOs of equal priority are 19 honored seriatum – first come, first served. If one such EWO is 20 in force when the employer receives a second EWO of equal or 21 lesser priority, the second EWO is “ineffective” and is returned 22 23 CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.23(c). 24 13“‘Earnings assignment order for support’ means an order, made pursuant to Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 5200) of Part 25 5 of Division 9 of the Family Code or Section 3088 of the Probate Code, which requires an employer to withhold earnings for 26 support.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.011(d). They are not governed 27 by the Wage Garnishment Law, are not “earnings withholding orders,” and have priority over any EWO. ALAN M. AHART, CALIFORNIA 28 PRACTICE GUIDE: ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AND DEBTS § 6:1219 (Rutter Group 2005) (AHART, ENFORCING JUDGMENTS). 1 to the levying officer to await a subsequent levy after the first 2 EWO is paid in full. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.023(c).14 3 Or, second, if the second-arriving EWO is senior in 4 priority, then an EWO already in effect becomes “suspended” while 5 the priority order is paid but remains in the hands of the 6 employer to be resumed when the priority EWO is paid in full. 7 CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. §§ 706.022(a)(4) & § 706.032(a)(2).15 8 Or, third, when support is involved, an employer withholds 9 earnings simultaneously pursuant to an EWO for support (or 10 earnings assignment order for support) and another EWO. CAL. CODE 11 CIV. PRO. § 706.030(c)(3).16 12 Why the simultaneous treatment? Simple. There is a 13 14 14“If an earnings withholding order is served while an employer is required to comply with another earnings withholding 15 order with respect to the earnings of the same employee, the subsequent order is ineffective and the employer shall not 16 withhold earnings pursuant to the subsequent order ...” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.023(c). 17 15“‘Withholding period’ means the period which commences on 18 the 10th day after service of an earnings withholding order upon the employer and which continues until the earliest of the 19 following dates: ... (4) The date of termination of a dormant or 20 suspended withholding order as determined pursuant to Section 706.032.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.022(a). 21 “(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute: ... (2) If 22 withholding under an earnings withholding order ceases because the judgment debtor’s earnings are subject to an order or 23 assignment with higher priority, the earnings withholding order terminates at the conclusion of a continuous two-year period 24 during which no amounts are withheld under the order.” CAL. CODE 25 CIV. PRO. § 706.032(a)(2). 16“(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter: 26 ... (3) Subject to paragraph (2) and to Article 3 [Restrictions 27 on Earnings Withholding] (commencing with Section 706.050), an employer shall withhold earnings pursuant to both a withholding 28 order for support and another earnings withholding order simultaneously.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.030(c)(3). 1 statutory limit to the amount that may be withheld per pay 2 period, typically 25 percent of disposable income. CAL. CODE CIV. 3 PRO. §§ 706.050 - 706.052. 4 Consider, as an example, a $300.00 withholding limit due to 5 disposable income of $1,200.00. If there is a priority support 6 order (earnings assignment order or EWO for support) for $250.00, 7 then the remaining $50.00 is available for the non-support EWO. 8 But if earnings for a particular pay period do not permit 9 withholding more than the support amount, then there is nothing 10 for the EWO to capture and, hence, that EWO is said to be 11 “dormant.” CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.022(a)(4). The “dormant” EWO 12 lays to the side ready to pounce whenever there is an amount that 13 can be withheld in excess of the support amount. 14 In other words, when an EWO for support and an EWO are 15 simultaneously in effect, the amount required to be withheld for 16 support is deducted first and the amount, if any, for the non- 17 support EWO is determined by subtracting the support amount from 18 the total amount that could otherwise be withheld under a non- 19 support order. AHART, ENFORCING JUDGMENTS §§ 6:1224-25. 20 In scenarios two (“suspended” EWO) and three (“dormant” 21 EWO), the employer retains an EWO until it terminates. 22 23 2 24 The facts of this case suggest that the third scenario 25 applied, which permits simultaneous withholding. The employer, 26 in light of exposure to the attendant lien, likely would have 27 returned Cavalry’s EWO as ineffective if it could have done so. 28 1 It appears that what happened is that initially LeGrand’s 2 income was less than or equal to the support order, and that 3 Cavalry’s EWO lay “dormant.” When LeGrand began to work overtime 4 in May 2019, the increase in income had the effect of raising the 5 limit on what could be garnished above the sum needed to honor 6 the support order, at which point Cavalry’s “dormant” EWO pounced 7 on the surplus available to withhold. 8 Therein lies the answer to the question, “Why no withholding 9 before May 22 on Cavalry’s EWO?” Answer: no increased income 10 until the May 22 payroll. LeGrand’s overtime averaged 23.35 11 hours per week for the seven weeks in question.17 12 13 E 14 Cavalry and Winn suggest in defense that an objectively 15 reasonable basis for their inaction ensues from “irregular” 16 procedure because their EWO was not immediately returned by the 17 employer as ineffective. As there was no irregularity, that 18 defense is unavailing, especially among expert debt collectors. 19 Several inescapable facts belie any irregularity supporting 20 an objectively reasonable explanation. Cavalry and Winn knew 21 that their EWO was retained by the employer. They also knew that 22 § 706.030(c)(3) requires simultaneous withholding where 23 withholding for support is involved. They also knew that the 24 prior order involved family support. They also knew that their 25 26 17The pay advices for the payment dates May 22, June 19, 27 June 26, July 3, July 10, July 17, and August 7 reflect overtime at an average of 23.35 hours for those seven weeks. The support 28 for those weeks was $241.84/week, instead of the $216.48/week reported in the Employer’s Return the previous February 14. 1 EWO would remain effective for up to two years. They also knew 2 that the debtor had filed a bankruptcy case triggering the 3 automatic stay and then had received a discharge triggering the 4 discharge injunction. They also knew they had an affirmative 5 duty to ensure that their “dormant” EWO would not cause any 6 garnishment violating the automatic stay or discharge injunction. 7 Finally, after learning on July 10, 2019, that their 8 “dormant” EWO was triggering garnishments, and with knowledge of 9 the automatic stay violation beginning with the May 22 10 garnishment and with knowledge of the discharge injunction, they 11 waited nineteen days to terminate their EWO on July 29, 2019, 12 three days after debtor’s counsel filed the instant motion. 13 Conspicuously absent from the response by Cavalry and Winn 14 is any attempt to explain, extenuate, or excuse their nineteen- 15 day delay in terminating their EWO. 16 In short, there is no objectively reasonable basis for 17 concluding that the conduct of Cavalry and Winn might be lawful. 18 Enforcement of their “dormant” EWO in the face of the automatic 19 stay before discharge exposes them to § 362(k)(1). 20 21 II 22 Automatic stay violation remedies are prescribed by 23 § 362(k)(1) for victims who are individuals.18 Congress provided 24 that the court may award actual damages, including costs and 25 attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, punitive 26 27 18Civil contempt also applies to § 362 stay violations, 28 regardless of whether the victim is an individual. Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2003). 1 damages. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). 2 3 A 4 Stay violation liability under § 362(k)(1) continues until 5 full restitution is actually made or, if after expiration of the 6 stay, until the court orders full restitution. Snowden v. Check 7 Into Cash of Wash., Inc. (In re Snowden), 769 F.3d 651, 659 & 662 8 (9th Cir. 2014); Sundquist v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re 9 Sundquist), 566 B.R. 563, 586 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2017). 10 11 B 12 The willfulness of the stay violation is a question of fact. 13 Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Leetien (In re Leetien), 309 F.3d 1210, 14 1213 (9th Cir. 1992). This instance entails multi-step analysis. 15 When the automatic stay came into effect as a consequence of 16 the filing of LeGrand’s voluntary chapter 7 filing, Cavalry’s EWO 17 was in the hands of the employer in a “dormant” status. The EWO 18 was effective and potent to the extent that whenever LeGrand’s 19 disposable income within garnishment limits exceeded his family 20 support obligation then the Cavalry EWO would be honored. 21 Cavalry’s EWO, like what the military has variously known as 22 booby trap, surprise firing device, IED, or land mine awaited 23 automatic detonation by the stimulus of surplus income. 24 Cavalry and Winn knew of the bankruptcy filing and of the 25 automatic stay, knew that their EWO remained effective to trigger 26 a withholding upon the occurrence of increased income, and knew 27 that the correct way to disarm the EWO was to terminate it. 28 1 One might debate whether Cavalry and Winn willfully violated 2 the automatic stay when they did not immediately terminate their 3 EWO upon learning of the bankruptcy filing and the automatic 4 stay, or, instead, when the EWO actually captured some surplus 5 wages. In either event, it counts as “willful.” 6 A creditor who knows of the automatic stay and has the power 7 to revoke some contingent action that would violate the stay but 8 declines to do so acts “willfully” for purposes of § 362(k)(1). 9 It follows that Cavalry and Winn were “willful” in their 10 violations of the automatic stay. 11 12 III 13 What of the fact that some of Cavalry’s garnishments 14 occurred after the discharge was entered? 15 As the Supreme Court has made explicit, bankruptcy courts 16 have civil contempt authority for discharge violations derived 17 from the conjunction of § 524(a)(2) and § 105(a). 11 U.S.C. 18 §§ 105(a) & 524(a)(2); Taggart, 139 S.Ct. at 1801. 19 20 A 21 The usual remedy for discharge injunction infractions are 22 limited to civil contempt. The appropriate parameters of civil 23 contempt in any given situation are fact intensive. 24 Civil contempt sanctions are designed to coerce compliance 25 and to compensate for losses, including costs and attorneys’ 26 fees, stemming from noncompliance with the injunction. Taggart, 27 139 S.Ct at 1801; United States v. Utd. Mine Workers of Am., 330 28 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947); Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1192; In re Dickerson, B.R. 289, 297-98 (Bankr. D. Id. 2014). 2 Taggart clarifies that the standard to find civil contempt 3 objective, but subjective good or bad faith may affect the size of the range of losses attributable to noncompliance with the injunction. Bad faith may widen the range of what is 6 |} compensatory. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) ($996,644.65). Good faith may narrow the range. Young v. United 8 |} States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987). 9 In addition to coercion and compensation, civil contempt 10 may, if necessary, include “relatively mild” non-compensatory 11] fines tailored to rule enforcement. Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1193; 12 |] Dickerson, 510 B.R. at 298. 13 In sum, the degree of sanctions other than compensation is limited to the least possible exercise of power adequate to the end of preventing repetition. Taggart, 139 S.Ct. at 1802. 16 17 18 When, as here, a violation of the discharge injunction is 19 merely continuation of pre-discharge conduct that violated the 20} automatic stay, § 362(k) (1) continues to provide stronger, more 21] explicit, and more definite statutory remedies that are more 22} adequate to the task than the least-possible-exercise-of-power 23} restriction on civil contempt. 24 An automatic stay violation that continues post-discharge 25 remains eligible for § 362(k) (1) remedies, including actual 26} damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and, punitive damages, until 27 the stay violation is purged by actual restitution. Snowden, 769 28) F.3d at 659 & 662; Sundgquist, 566 B.R. at 586.

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1 It would be an odd system that strips an individual debtor 2 of the potent § 362(k)(1) statutory punitive damages remedy 3 against a creditor violating the automatic stay in bad faith but 4 then holds that, because the stay violation persisted past entry 5 of discharge, the § 524 discharge injunction insulates that same 6 bad actor with civil contempt’s milder least-possible-exercise- 7 of-power approach of civil contempt. 8 9 IV 10 Under either the § 362(k)(1) regime for automatic stay 11 violations or the civil contempt regime for discharge injunction 12 violations, the relative good or bad faith of the defendant is 13 relevant to fashioning the award. And, in the case of 14 § 362(k)(1), such analysis is vital to the question of whether 15 circumstances are “appropriate” for punitive damages. 16 17 A 18 We begin by positing the baseline for what would have been a 19 good faith response to notice the automatic stay was being 20 violated. 21 The good faith response to the July 10 letter faxed to 22 Cavalry’s counsel by LeGrand’s counsel would have been an 23 immediate message or telephone call to the effect: “There must 24 have been a mistake. We apologize. We are immediately 25 investigating to correct the situation by making sure our EWO is 26 terminated and promise to make the debtor whole.” 27 If that good faith response had been made, then the 28 attorneys’ fee component of damages would have been low and 1 punitive damages would be less likely to be awarded. 2 3 4 B 5 That good faith response was not what happened. The facts 6 are more indicative of lack of good faith. 7 8 1 9 Cavalry and Winn did nothing for nineteen days after 10 receiving formal notice from debtor’s counsel – no call to 11 debtor’s counsel, no email to debtor’s counsel, no letter to 12 debtor’s counsel, no effort towards terminating the EWO. No 13 effort to act like reasonable adults. Meanwhile, at least two 14 more withholdings occurred. 15 Nor can Cavalry and Winn hide behind honest mistake. They 16 knew the law regarding “dormant” EWOs linked to support 17 obligations (“premier creditor’s rights firm in California”). 18 They knew as of the Employer’s Return of February 14 that they 19 had a “dormant” EWO lodged with the employer that would remain 20 effective for two years. They admitted in open court that they 21 knew they had an affirmative duty to terminate that EWO. When 22 they received notice of entry of discharge, they knew that no 23 theory of law would validate that “dormant” EWO.19 24 25 19They may have been betting that the chapter 7 case would be dismissed before entry of discharge so that the “dormant” 26 order would retain vitality and betting that there would be no 27 surplus income available to garnish while the automatic stay was in effect. As it turned out, they lost both bets. The case was 28 not dismissed and there were garnishments while the automatic stay was in effect. Now it is time to pay up under § 362(k)(1). 1 Despite all that knowledge, it was not until after receipt 2 by Cavalry and Winn of the debtor’s sanctions motion filed and 3 served by mail on day sixteen after the July 10 notice that 4 Cavalry and Winn acted to terminate their EWO. 5 This smacks of a passive-aggressive mindset of doing nothing 6 on the chance that debtor’s counsel may not figure out how to 7 initiate a legal action or may back off out of concern for 8 expense. Perhaps that is a useful collection strategy elsewhere. 9 But in the face of the bankruptcy automatic stay and the 10 discharge injunction, it amounts to playing with fire. 11 Bottom line: no inference of good faith on those facts. 12 13 2 14 The papers presented by Winn materially misstate key facts 15 so as to hide its nineteen-day delay. 16 The fact is that Winn received the faxed letter from the 17 debtor’s counsel on July 10 and did nothing by way of response 18 and ignored all telephone calls until July 19 when, after Winn 19 had received mail service of the debtor’s motion for sanctions, 20 Winn issued a termination of the earnings withholding order. 21 That chronology adds up to a nineteen-day stonewall by Winn 22 with knowledge of on-going violation of the discharge injunction, 23 which led to at least two additional garnishments. Winn has 24 explaining to do, but curiously makes no attempt to do so. 25 Winn dodges mention of its nineteen-day stonewall nine times 26 with statements implying it acted promptly. For example: “Winn 27 terminated the levy upon review of the letter from debtor’s 28 1 counsel, prior to receipt of any funds.”20 2 All in all, those statements are designed to cover up Winn’s 3 nineteen-day delay and are indicative of less than good faith. 4 5 3 6 Respondent’s papers materially misstate the law by way of 7 selective citations that focus on a general rule and omit mention 8 of the applicable exception. There is no mention of the section 9 10 20Declaration of Laura McCarthy Hoalst, ¶ 13. The other eight statements are: 11 “Upon notice of the employer’s enforcement of the earnings 12 withholding order, Winn terminated the levy and instructed the sheriff to release any funds to the debtor.” Response to Order 13 to Show Cause, p.2, ll.18-19. 14 “The file remained closed until debtor’s counsel, Sharon [Susan] Turner, contacted this office regarding the execution. 15 As of that date, no funds had been received from the sheriff, and 16 a termination of the execution was sent to the sheriff on July 29, 2019.” Memorandum of Authorities, p.2, ll.12-14. 17 “Upon learning of the belated enforcement of the wage levy, 18 Winn issued a termination of the execution on July 29, 2019, instructing any funds to be returned to the debtor.” Memorandum 19 of Authorities, p.3, ll.13-15. 20 “Upon being made aware, Winn terminated the levy.” 21 Memorandum of Authorities, p.5, ll.7-8. 22 “Any delay in issuing the termination was without intent and knowledge that the employer enforced the executed [sic] 23 approximately three months after service.” Memorandum of Authorities, p.5, ll.12-14. 24 “As soon as the respondents learned of the garnishment, they 25 terminated.” Hearing Transcript, p.7, ll.11-12 (Atty Hoalst to court). 26 27 “As soon as Winn Law Group became aware of the situation, they terminated.” Id., p.9, ll.7-8 (Atty Hoalst to court). 28 “As soon as we learned about it, we terminated it.” Id., p.21, ll.7-8. 1 that provides for simultaneous enforcement of withholding for 2 support and an EWO. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 706.030(c)(3). 3 Instead of citing and addressing the implications of 4 § 706.030(c)(3), notice of the applicability of which was 5 implicit in the Employer’s Return that reported that the EWO was 6 not being returned as “ineffective,” Winn hides from 7 § 706.030(c)(3) and perpetrates an exercise in misdirection 8 designed to create the misimpression that the subject 9 garnishments were the result of improper procedure. 10 Winn’s brief cites only to § 706.023 rendering garden- 11 variety EWOs as “ineffective” in situations not involving a prior 12 support order and to § 706.104 governing the Employer’s Return, 13 requiring return to the levying officer of an “ineffective” EWO. 14 Then the brief quotes the description of § 706.023 and § 706.104 15 in a prominent California treatise, AHART, ENFORCING JUDGMENTS 16 §§ 6:1215-16. Memorandum of Authorities, pp.3-4. 17 As explained above, § 706.030(c)(3) simultaneous withholding 18 constitutes an exception to the general rule of priority in 19 § 706.023. The same Ahart treatise, on which Winn relies, agrees 20 and accurately describes the exception regarding simultaneous 21 withholding. AHART, ENFORCING JUDGMENTS §§ 6:1224-25. 22 Yet Winn blames something abnormal about the simultaneous 23 withholding prescribed by § 706.030(c)(3).21 All was correct. 24 21“No further action was taken to enforce the judgment after 25 receipt of the notice [of bankruptcy]. This was because of the employer’s return indicating that there was already a support 26 order received prior to the Cavalry writ. Under normal 27 procedure, the writ would not have been enforced.” Declaration of Laura McCarthy Hoalst, ¶ 7 (emphasis supplied). In fact, the 28 procedure was correct and normal. 1 This court seriously doubts that “the premier creditor 2 rights law firm in California” innocently forgot to mention 3 § 706.030(c)(3) and innocently forgot to read and cite to the 4 court the next page of the Ahart treatise. 5 In fact, the Employer’s Return in this instance noted that 6 there was a prior order for support and that Cavalry’s EWO was 7 not being returned as “ineffective.” 8 9 V 10 Next comes the question of remedies. 11 12 A 13 This court is persuaded by clear and convincing evidence 14 that Cavalry and Winn “willfully” violated the automatic stay by 15 not preventing the Cavalry EWO from being enforced on seven 16 occasions following the filing of the debtor’s chapter 7 case, a 17 consequence which is that actual damages, including costs and 18 19 “In this case, it appears that the employer starting [sic] enforcing the writ May 22, 2019, enforcing it after the prior 20 order expired or was satisfied. This was not proper procedure as 21 set forth in the Ahart, California Practice Guide.” Memorandum of Authorities, p.4, ll.13-15 (emphasis supplied). In fact, it 22 was precisely the proper procedure as described on the next page of the Ahart treatise. 23 “Winn ... relied on the employer’s return that it was 24 ineffective due to an existing levy.” Id., p.5, ll.11-12. The Employer’s Return, quite properly, did not say the writ was 25 ineffective and did say the writ was not being returned. 26 “The employer’s return indicated that a previously served 27 levy was pending. Procedurally, the writ should have been returned to the sheriff and would have expired.” Response of 28 Winn Law Group, p.2, ll.9-11 (emphasis supplied). Wrong again. 1 attorneys’ fees are in order pursuant to § 362(k)(1). 2 This court is also persuaded that this situation presents 3 § 362(k)(1) “appropriate circumstances” for punitive damages. 4 Winn and Cavalry have conducted themselves in reckless or 5 callous disregard for the rights of the debtor and not in good 6 faith. Goichman v. Bloom (In re Bloom), 875 F.2d 224, 228 (9th 7 Cir. 1989). 8 Upon being notified of the offending garnishments, they did 9 nothing that could be construed as a good faith response. They 10 stonewalled debtor’s counsel for nineteen days without excuse – 11 no response to her written notice, no response to her numerous 12 phone calls, no voluntary termination of the EWO. It was only 13 under the compulsion resulting from mail service of the debtor’s 14 sanctions motion, which had been filed on day sixteen, that they 15 terminated the EWO. This delay caused two additional 16 garnishments to occur. Callous disregard of the law and the 17 rights of the debtor is an understatement. 18 In this court, Winn and Cavalry have conspicuously failed to 19 address, explain, extenuate, or excuse their nineteen-day delay 20 in terminating the EWO. They have misrepresented facts in their 21 papers. They have misrepresented the law in their papers. 22 Notice of the possibility of punitive damages was given in 23 this court’s Order to Show Cause. Winn and Cavalry have 24 addressed the question in their responses and at the hearing. 25 26 B 27 Attorneys’ fees and costs are claimed by debtor’s counsel to 28 have been $4,500.00 as of August 20, 2019. Winn has conceded 1 that it will pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and raised 2 no opposition to that sum. The time reasonably necessary to 3 prepare for and appear at the hearing in court warrants an 4 additional $1,000.00. Hence, the damages component attributable 5 to attorneys’ fees and costs is $5,500.00. 6 There is no dispute that the amount actually garnished was 7 $883.35. Winn has documented $165.37 in refunds to the debtor. 8 Actual damages include emotional distress. Dawson v. Wash. 9 Mutual Bank (In re Dawson), 390 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2004). 10 The declaration by Mr. LeGrand, prepared on July 18, 2019, 11 in the midst of the garnishments describes how they were posing a 12 hardship. He and his family, including three young children at 13 home, were living on a tight budget that was being thrown into 14 deficit by the garnishments. He was worried about being able to 15 pay rent and buy food. The loss of those funds was proving 16 “extremely stressful.” He expected a fresh start from bankruptcy 17 but the unexpected garnishment forced him to spend a lot of time 18 working with his attorney; the whole situation was “stressful” 19 and “terrible.” Declaration of Debtor, Dkt. 23 (7/18/19). 20 The length of the period of the garnishments from May 22 and 21 through August 7 necessarily imposed some emotional distress on 22 an individual wage earner trying to support a family on a tight 23 budget while working an average of twenty-three hours of overtime 24 per week. That continuing emotional distress must have been 25 aggravated by the nineteen-day stonewall by Cavalry and Winn. 26 Some confirmation of stress and disruption inflicted on the 27 debtor comes from the observation in a filing of August 20, 2019, 28 by his counsel, who is essentially a solo practitioner, that “a 1 significant amount of time” had been consumed communicating with 2 her client “far more than initially anticipated.” Motion of 3 Sanctions for Violations of Automatic Stay, p.3, ll.2-3. It is a 4 fact of law practice that representing individuals in matters 5 such as bankruptcy entails a considerable amount of time spent 6 helping to calm the fears of clients. 7 This court is persuaded by a preponderance of evidence and 8 based on its assessment of the credibility of Mr. LeGrand, and 9 notwithstanding the absence of expert opinion evidence, that 10 there has been emotional distress deserving of compensation in 11 the amount of $3,500.00. 12 Accordingly, actual damages total $9,883.35.22 13 14 C 15 Punitive damages are authorized by § 362(k)(1) in 16 “appropriate cases.” As this court has previously explained, 17 this is a statutory form of punitive damages as to which Congress 18 has provided little guidance. Sundquist, 566 B.R. at 609-14. 19 Case law regarding § 362(k)(1) establishes that there should 20 be some showing of reckless or callous disregard for the law or 21 for rights of others. Bloom, 875 F.2d at 228. 22 That reckless-or-callous-disregard standard can be 23 established by conduct that is malicious, wanton, or oppressive. 24 Snowden, 769 F.3d at 657. 25 The Supreme Court in dealing with common law punitive 26 damages has installed three guideposts: (1) degree of 27 28 22A credit of $165.37 will be allowed against the judgment for funds returned by Winn. 1 reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity 2 between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff 3 and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between 4 the punitive damages awarded and civil penalties authorized or 5 imposed in comparable cases. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. 6 v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003); BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. 7 Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 8 The nineteen-day stonewall tips the scales of 9 reprehensibility in this case. Sophisticated debt collectors 10 plainly know the law regarding the bankruptcy automatic stay. 11 There is no explanation other than reckless or callous disregard 12 for the law for not immediately having terminated the EWO upon 13 learning of the stay violations. Although Cavalry and Winn were 14 given full and fair opportunity to explain why they refused 15 promptly to respond to debtor’s counsel and did nothing until 16 after the debtor filed and served the motion for sanctions, they 17 say nothing about that period and implicitly equate nineteen days 18 and two additional garnishments with “immediate” action. 19 An award of approximately two and one half times the actual 20 damages will be proportional and within traditional bounds. 21 Comparable cases in matters such as the Fair Debt Collection 22 Act, in which the majority are attorneys’ fee awards, regularly 23 exceed that which is being awarded here as punitive damages. 24 Hence, punitive damages are awarded under § 362(k)(1) in the 25 amount of $25,000.00. 26 27 VI 28 Finally, Winn contends that Cavalry should not be held liable for any award because Winn, as Cavalry’s counsel, is the party that did not terminate the EWO when it should have done so 3 upon learning of the bankruptcy filing. 4 It is, however, long settled law that clients are held 5 accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys. 6 || Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 380, 396-97 (1993); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 8 || 633-34 (1962); Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1879). 9 Cavalry and Winn are sophisticated debt collectors who know 10 || and are expected to comply with bankruptcy law. The acts and 11 omissions of Winn in this case were on behalf of Cavalry, the 121 party that reviewed the notice of bankruptcy and directed that 13] the file be closed. There is nothing unfair about holding both 14] Cavalry and Winn accountable. To the extent they disagree, they 15 remain free to allocate the consequences among themselves. 16 17 KEK 18 Cavalry and Winn willfully violated the automatic stay and 19 |} pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (1) are jointly and severally 20 |) liable for $34,883.35, consisting of actual damages of $9,883.35 21 |) and punitive damages of $25,000.00. 22 23 || Dated; February 06, 2020 Wwe \| 25 hed ft 26 United States Bankrupeey Judge 27 28

25

1 INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK OF COURT

SERVICE LIST

2 The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the attached 3 document, via the BNC, to the following parties: 4 Dumace Leonard LeGrand 7811 Sumersdale Dr., #170 5 Sacramento, CA 95823 6 Susan J. Turner 331 J Street #200 7 Sacramento, CA 95814 8 Laura McCarthy Hoalst Winn Law Group 9 110 East Wilshire Avenue, Suite 212 Fullerton, CA 92832-1960 10 Douglas M. Whatley 11 PO Box 538 Folsom, CA 95763-0538 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28