facts alleged to support a cognizable theory.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). “We must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. . . .” Id. at 886-87

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court dismissed Parker’s complaint—which alleged (1)

defamation; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(4) federal RICO violations; (5) federal RICO conspiracy; and (6) tortious

interference—because the applicable statutes of limitation barred Parker’s federal

claims. We agree.

Civil RICO actions are governed by a four-year statute of limitations, see

Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S.143, 156 (1987),

2 and “federal civil rights claims under sections 1981 [and] 1983” are “governed by

the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” Bonelli v.

Grand Canyon Univ., 28 F.4th 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). In

Oregon, the limitations period for personal injury actions is two years. See Or.

Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1); see also Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666

F.3d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Oregon has a two-year statute of limitations for

general personal injury claims . . .”) (citation omitted).

1. Parker’s federal claims are subject to the “injury discovery” rule. See

Bonelli, 28 F.4th at 952 (“The general rule is that a civil rights claim accrues under

federal law when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is

the basis of the action.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the “injury

discovery” rule to civil RICO claims). In 1988, Parker asserted claims under

§ 1981, § 1983, and the Oregon RICO statute against Burns, Miller Nash, Shell,

Exxon, Chevron, Union Oil, Atlantic Richfield, and Texaco. Between 1988 and

1999, Parker filed five more complaints alleging the same claims. Thus, the record

reflects that Parker’s claims accrued as early as 1988, and each applicable statute

of limitations had expired when he filed his most recent complaint in 2022. See

3 Bonelli, 28 F.4th at 952.1

2. Parker contends that the Oregon Legislature’s formal apology, by way

of Senate Concurrent Resolution 22 (SCR 22), exonerated him, gave him reason to

know of his claims against Appellees, and tolled the applicable statutes of

limitation. Parker relies upon Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994)

(holding that a claim for damages that would invalidate a prior criminal conviction

or sentence is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction has been vacated);

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying

Heck to hold that a plaintiff’s “false arrest and imprisonment claims were not

cognizable and did not accrue until his conviction was invalidated”), and the

exoneration standard set forth in Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 566 (Or. 1993)

(en banc) (“Plaintiff had not suffered such harm at defendant’s hands . . . unless

and until he was exonerated of the criminal offense.”). However, those cases do

not support the conclusion that SCR 22 tolled the statutes of limitation in this case.

Parker’s injury was not “attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence.”

Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. Nor were Parker’s claims “connected to the [criminal]

trial and appeals processes.” Drollinger v. Mallon, 260 P.3d 482, 490 n.8 (Or.

2011) (en banc) (clarifying that the “principles that drove [the Oregon Supreme

1 The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims of defamation and tortious interference. Therefore, those claims are not before us.

4 Court’s] decision in Stevens are . . . more strongly connected to the [criminal] trial

and appeals processes”). Therefore, SCR 22 did not toll the applicable statute of

limitations.

3. Contrary to Parker’s argument, the applicable statutes of limitation

were not tolled by fraudulent concealment. Parker has not demonstrated that

Appellees “used fraudulent means to keep [him] unaware of his cause of action,”

and that he was “ignorant of the existence of his cause of action.” Oracle Am. Inc.

v. Hewlett Packard Enter. Co., 971 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

4. Finally, Parker posits that the Attorney General’s participation in this

action violated Or. Rev. Stat. § 180.060. Because the action is otherwise barred,

we do not address this issue on appeal.

AFFIRMED.

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