facts in the complaint might ultimately support a defense to a criminal trespassing

charge.5

3 See Ove, 264 F.3d at 821. 4 See United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 5 Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403, 134 S. Ct. at 1691. 3 Because Doscher failed to plead an underlying constitutional or federal law

violation, his other federal claims were also properly dismissed. See Olsen v.

Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (42 U.S.C. § 1985);

Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653–54 (9th Cir. 2001) (municipal

liability); Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988)

(42 U.S.C. § 1986).

However, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Doscher’s Washington

state law claims. While a district court “‘may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction’ over remaining state law claims,”6 the district court did not indicate

that it was exercising that discretion here. We thus reverse the dismissal of

Doscher’s Washington claims and remand to give the court an opportunity to do

so. See Pell, 99 F.4th at 1135.

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters

not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

6 Pell, 99 F.4th at 1135; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Koepping v. Tri- Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist., 120 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 1997). 4